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FIGHTING FIRE WITH . . . MIRE?
CIVIL REMEDIES AND THE NEW WAR
ON STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM
WILLIAM P. HOYE*
I.  INTRODUCTION
On the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, hijackers flew
passenger jetliners into each of New York City’s World Trade Center
towers and the Pentagon in Virginia, in the worst terror attack in U.S.
history.1  Nearly 4, 500 people perished in the well-coordinated attack,
which U.S. officials believe was orchestrated by Osama bin Laden, a
Saudi-born millionaire tied to the 1998 bombings of two American
embassies in Africa and the bombing of a U.S. warship in Yemen in
2000.2  The devastating events of September 11th galvanized the
United States and led President George W. Bush to declare, “We will
not only deal with those who dare attack America, we will deal with
those who harbor them and feed them and house them.”3  President
Bush was clearly referring to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,4
which allegedly gave bin Laden refuge for more than five years prior
to the attacks.5  President Bush vowed that the United States would
make no distinction between those who carried out the hijackings and
those who supported them.6
By October 7, 2001, less than one month after the attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, U.S. and British war planes
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1. Serge Schemann, President Vows to Exact Punishment For ‘Evil,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2001, at A1.
2. Christopher Dickey, Training for Terror, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at 42.
3. Evan Thomas et al., Bush: We’re at War, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at 29.
4. Dickey, supra note 2, at 42; see also Thomas et al., supra note 3, at 29.
5. Dickey, supra note 2, at 42.
6. Schmemann, supra note 1, at A1.
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had bombed targets in Afghanistan and a comprehensive “War on
Terrorism” had begun.  The campaign focused not only on the ter-
rorists, but also on the states that financed, trained, and supported
them.  Bank accounts believed to contain money used to fund terror-
ist organizations around the world were frozen,7 and a broad-based
coalition of more than forty states was formed.  This development led
the United States, the United Nations, and others, to address with
new urgency the issue of how to effectively combat state-sponsored
terrorism.  With uncharacteristic speed, the United Nations Security
Council unanimously adopted a resolution requiring all 189 U.N.
member states to deny money, support, and sanctuary to terrorists.8
Undoubtedly, few acts, if any, are more egregious or shocking to
the conscience than states utilizing their vast sovereign powers and
resources to finance and sponsor acts of terrorism, such as hijackings,
kidnappings, bombings, extrajudicial killings, or military attacks di-
rected at innocent civilians.  This is especially true since terrorist acts
by definition are designed to intimidate a population or compel de-
sired action or inaction by another government or international or-
ganization.9  The victims of terrorist acts are rarely the primary target
or concern of the state sponsor or terrorist organization.  Tragically,
they are often simply in the wrong place at the wrong time.
During the past several decades, and especially in recent years,
the number of terrorist acts directed at citizens living and traveling
abroad has been on the rise, especially with respect to attacks against
U.S. citizens.  Many of these acts have been perpetrated by individu-
als or groups who are sponsored, directed, supported, or funded, in
whole or in part, by states.  For example, in the 1979 Iranian hostage
crisis, terrorists supported by the Khomeni government in Iran seized
the United States embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two Americans
hostage for 444 days.10
In the subsequent two decades, newspapers and magazines
around the world have been filled with stories of state-sponsored ter-
rorist acts involving gross violations of human rights, such as kidnap-
7. As of October 22, 2001, the U.S. had found and frozen about $300 million of Osama bin
Laden’s and the Taliban’s money.  Cathy Booth Thomas, Osama Will Pay. This time in Cash,
TIME, Oct. 22, 2001, at 22.
8. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001); see also, Funds in 50 Accounts Fro-
zen, THE SOUTH BEND TRIBUNE, Oct. 2, 2001, at A3.
9. See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec.
9, 1999, art. 2(1)(b), 39 I.L.M. 270, 271.
10. Daniel Pipes, American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, July 8, 1985, at 37.
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pings, extrajudicial murders, torture, hijackings, and suicide bombings
in which American citizens have been injured or killed.  In addition to
the recent World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, specific exam-
ples include the following:
 Beginning on January 8, 1985, U.S. citizens with no connec-
tion to the U.S. government, David Jacobsen, Joseph Cicip-
pio, Frank Reed, and Rev. Lawrence M. Jenco were inde-
pendently assaulted and abducted in Lebanon and held as
prisoners11 by members of Hezbollah, a politico-paramilitary
organization “funded and controlled by the Iranian govern-
ment and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security.”12
 Terry Anderson, an American journalist, was kidnapped at
gunpoint in Lebanon on March 16, 1985, and held hostage for
nearly seven years by agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran
at the behest of the Iranian Ministry of Information and Se-
curity (MOIS).13
 Hezbollah abducted Dr. Thomas Sutherland, a U.S. citizen
and Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture at the American Uni-
versity of Beirut, on June 9, 1985, and held him for more than
six years.14
 The MOIS, again acting upon the orders of the Iranian gov-
ernment, assassinated Dr. Cyrus Elahi, a dissident of the Ira-
nian regime, and naturalized American citizen, living in Paris,
France, in front of his home on October 23, 1990.15
 On April 9, 1995, a suicide bomber and member of the Pales-
tine Islamic Jihad, a terrorist cell wholly funded by the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, drove a van loaded with explosives
into a public passenger bus in Israel, killing Alisa M. Flatow,
a twenty year old American college student.16
 Acting under orders from their government, Cuban Air
Force planes fired air-to-air missiles without warning at two
11. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D.D.C. 1998); Estate of
Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2001).
12. Jenco, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 30.  Ultimately, Hezbollah was linked to seventeen kidnap-
pings, as well as car bombings that killed more than 300 people at the U.S. embassy and a U.S.
marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983.  Susan Postlewaite & Stan Crock, The Lockerbie
Trial May Actually Help Qaddafi, BUS. WK. (Int’l Ed.), May 15, 2000, at 27, 2000 WL 7826440.
13. Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107, 109–11 (D.D.C. 2000).
14. Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001).
15. Estate of Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103–04 (D.D.C. 2000).
16. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998).
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private planes over international waters, killing three U.S.
citizens on a humanitarian mission.17
 In Jerusalem, on February 25, 1996, two other American stu-
dents, Matthew Eisenfeld and Sara Rachel Duker, were
killed in a bus bombing perpetrated by Hamas, another ter-
rorist organization funded by Iran.18
As these tragic examples illustrate, the United States and its citizens
have been prime targets for acts of state-sponsored terror for dec-
ades.19  Historically, however, foreign governments and their agents
have enjoyed broad common law and statutory immunity from crimi-
17. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
18. Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. Civ. 98-1945 RCL, 2000 WL 1918779, at *1
(D.D.C. July 11, 2000).
19. Two other noteworthy examples include the Pan Am and U.S. Embassy bombings.  In
December of 1988, 259 passengers and eleven bystanders were killed when Pan Am flight 103,
en route from London to the United States, exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland.  Rein v. Social-
ist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 754 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Sridhar Krish-
naswami, The Hindu-Editorial: Price of Pre-eminence, THE HINDU, Oct. 22, 2000, 2000 WL
27346383.  An independent international tribunal subsequently indicted two Libyan intelligence
government agents for their alleged roles in the bombing.  After eight years of intense interna-
tional pressure, Libyan President Muammar al-Qaddafi released the two suspects, and they
were placed on trial in the Netherlands.  Mark Smith, Lockerbie ‘Caused By Anti-Tank Explo-
sion,’ EVENING NEWS (Scot.), Apr. 21, 2001, at 4, 2001 WL 15548496.  The court convicted Ab-
del Basset Ali al-Megrahi, a Libyan intelligence agent, of the bombing in February 2001, hand-
ing down a life sentence and recommending he serve at least twenty years in prison.  Id.  The
court found his co-defendant, Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, not guilty.  Id.  During the trial, a former
terrorist testified that Libya also was involved in providing arms and information needed to
launch another act of state sponsored terrorism: the 1975 attack on an OPEC oil ministers’ con-
ference in Vienna, Austria, which left three people dead.  See Mirjam Mohr, Former Terrorist
Links Libya to 1975 OPEC Meeting Attack, AP NEWSWIRES, Oct. 19, 2000, WESTLAW, Apwire-
splus library.
In April of 1998, the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were bombed simultaneously
by terrorists linked by the U.S. government to Osama bin Laden, an exiled national of Saudi
Arabia.  Bin Laden reportedly enjoys close ties to the government of Sudan and the Taliban
militia in Afghanistan, which allegedly has been sheltering him from apprehension.  In the wake
of the bombings, “Washington launched punitive missile attacks against Afghanistan and Sudan
on the grounds that both states played an integral role in supporting the twin assaults.”  Peter
Chalk, Grave New World, BELL & HOWELL INFORMATION AND LEARNING COMPANY. FORUM
FOR APPLIED RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY, Spring 2000, at 13, 16.  According to an April
2001 report by the U.S. Department of State entitled ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism,’ Afghani-
stan’s Taliban continues to provide a primary safe haven for terrorists by harboring and aiding
Osama bin Laden and members of Al Qaeda.  Keiji Urakami, North Korea Could be Off Ter-
rorist Country List, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, May 1, 2001, available at http://web.lexis-nexis.
com/universe (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).  Of course, the governments and citizens of many
other governments have been victimized by state-sponsored terror as well.  Such incidents are
beyond the scope of this Article, although similar analysis could be done under the law of other
states.
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nal prosecution and civil lawsuits under international law, even for in-
ternational terrorist acts in which they have played key roles.20
In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Congress attempted to fill the gap in
international law related to the previously untouchable state sponsors
of terrorism.  After U.S. courts, in several important and highly publi-
cized cases (e.g., the Pan Am 103 bombing cases, the Iranian hostage
crisis cases, and others), held that several states, including Iran and
Libya, were immune from liability, Congress created a new civil rem-
edy with respect to certain designated state sponsors of terrorism.
Under the auspices of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),
Congress abrogated the immunity of foreign states involved in fund-
ing or sponsoring acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens abroad.  As a
result, U.S. citizens who were the victims of state-sponsored terrorism
could pursue civil lawsuits in U.S. courts against states identified by
the U.S. Department of State as supporting, ordering, sponsoring, or
funding acts of terror directed against American citizens abroad.21
This Article will examine and analyze the efficacy and advisabil-
ity of utilizing civil lawsuits in domestic courts as a means of providing
remedies to victims of state-sponsored terrorist acts.  Specifically, the
Article addresses the legality of such an approach under international
law, as well as its efficacy as a foreign policy tool.  Finally, in the con-
text of the U.S. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, this
Article examines whether civil litigation in the courts of a particular
state is an appropriate means of fighting state-sponsored terrorism in
the twenty-first century, especially in the wake of the tragic events of
September 11, 2001.
The Article is organized into seven parts, including this introduc-
tion and a brief conclusion.  Part II provides a brief overview of the
international community’s legal responses to state-sponsored terror-
ism.  Part III summarizes the statutory exceptions to sovereign immu-
nity crafted in recent years by the U.S. Congress.  Part IV surveys and
examines the reported case law to date under the FSIA since Con-
gress’s adoption of the Antiterrorism Act.  Part V analyzes the legal-
ity of the current U.S. statutory scheme under international law.  Part
VI presents a normative discussion of whether civil litigation in do-
mestic courts, even if permissible under international law, is the best
or even an appropriate means of combating state-sponsored terrorist
20. See Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 11.
21. See generally JOHN F. MURPHY, STATE SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS 32-33 (1970) for a discussion of the complex
distinctions between state toleration, support, and sponsorship of terrorism.
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acts directed against U.S. nationals abroad.  This Article recommends
expanding the jurisdiction of the envisaged International Criminal
Court (ICC) to enable an objective international tribunal to hear
cases, punish state actors and other individuals responsible for acts of
state-sponsored terror, and fairly compensate victims.  Such an ap-
proach would represent the most equitable way to compensate vic-
tims and punish offending states in an independent and credible fo-
rum.
II.  INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO
STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM
State-sponsored terrorist acts deprive innocent civilians of their
lives, their liberty, their property, and other rights and freedoms pro-
tected by various regional and international human rights treaties,22
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,23 the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,24 the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms,25 the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,26
and the American Convention on Human Rights.27  As a result, some
courts and commentators have suggested that state-sponsored terror-
ism might even violate a jus cogens norm28 of customary international
22. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Civil Remedies for International Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL BUS.
L.J. 169, 171, 177, 178 (“Victimization through state-sponsored terrorism, at the least, is one of
the most fundamental violations of human rights.” (citing Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction
over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International
Law under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 191, 194 (1983))).
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 8, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71.  Article 3 protects the right to life, liberty and the security of the person; Article 5
prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; Article 9 prohibits arbitrary arrest,
detention or exile.
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.  Article 2 protects the right to an effective remedy; Article
6 protects the inherent right to life; Article 9 protects the right to liberty and security of person
and prohibits arbitrary detention.
25. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  Article 2 protects the right to life and prohibits its depri-
vation; Article 3 prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment; Article 5 protects the right to lib-
erty and security of person.
26. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res.
XXX, O.A.S. Official Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev. 8.  Article I protects the right of every human
being to life, liberty, and the security of his person.
27. American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica), Nov. 22, 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123.  Article 4 prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life; Article 7 protects the
right to personal liberty and security of every person.
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law.29  This point remains hotly disputed, especially in the United
States.30  Nevertheless, it is notable that in at least ten resolutions of
the United Nations General Assembly, states have reaffirmed their
“unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of ter-
rorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever
committed.”31
Despite the nearly universal condemnation of state-sponsored
terror, international law does not provide a mechanism by which to
impose criminal penalties on states or governments that finance or
otherwise support terrorist activities.  Such states may be defendants
in civil lawsuits for money damages in some countries,32 or subject to
civil proceedings before regional and international human rights tri-
28. Janisson G. White, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Augusto Pinochet, Universal
Jurisdiction, the ICC, and a Wake-Up Call for Former Heads of State, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
127, 155 (1999) (“This type of norm was defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties as a ‘peremptory norm’ of international law . . . accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.”
(quoting Hilou v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994))).
29. Maria Ermolaeva, Crimes Without Punishment, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 755, 777 (1999) (“Cer-
tain rules protecting human rights are already clearly accepted by the international community
as peremptory norms of a jus cogens character.  Among them are the prohibitions of slavery,
piracy, genocide, terrorism, and torture.” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. n (1987), which specifies that genocide,
slave trade, slavery, murder, torture, and systematic racial discrimination are all violations of jus
cogens norms)).  Ms. Ermolaeva argues that the doctrine of universal jurisdiction is lent support
by the promulgation of international conventions based on jus cogens norms such as, inter alia,
the prohibition of terrorism.
30. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2152 (1999) (noting that three federal appeals courts have
rejected the notion that the FSIA contains a jus cogens exception).
31. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note
9, at 270.  See also International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted
Dec. 15, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-6, 37 I.L.M. 251 (1998); Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done
Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-1, 27 I.L.M. 685; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done Mar. 10, 1988, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 101-1, 27 I.L.M. 668, 672; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done Feb. 24, 1988, S. TREATY
DOC. 100-19, 27 I.L.M. 627; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted
Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 125; International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, adopted Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, includ-
ing Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.S.T. 167; Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done Sept. 23, 1971,
24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 178; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft, done Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 11641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
32. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1996).
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bunals.  In stark contrast to state sponsors of terrorist acts, individual
terrorists and international terrorist organizations face increasingly
severe domestic and international penalties for their conduct.  These
individuals or entities may be subject to domestic criminal prosecu-
tion or civil litigation in the country where the alleged acts occurred,
or in other countries having or claiming jurisdiction over them or
their acts.33  In the future, they also may be prosecuted before the
ICC.34
On December 9, 1999, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Fi-
nancing of Terrorism.35  The Convention requires its signatories to
criminalize certain acts and establish jurisdiction over individuals and
organizations financing terrorist activities, and to extradite or subject
such persons to prosecution.36  In this way, the Convention attempts
to expand “the framework for international cooperation in the inves-
tigation, prosecution, and extradition of [individual] persons who en-
33. For example, individual defendants may face proceedings in the domestic courts of any
state having subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the matter (e.g., the courts of the
states where the act occurred and where the accused is present).  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(A) (“A state has
jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes
place within its territory.”).  In addition, under the doctrine of passive personality jurisdiction,
the state where the victims resided may have jurisdiction, although the International Court of
Justice has not yet ruled on this point.  LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 657 (1999)
(“With respect to . . . certain acts of terrorism, states may rely upon ‘passive personality’ juris-
diction—that is, they may assert jurisdiction over extra-territorial crimes committed against
their nationals even when committed by non-nationals.”).  Finally, regional human rights tribu-
nals with jurisdiction may be in a position to provide reparations to victims who are able to
prove violations of relevant human rights treaties against the individual defendants.  See, e.g.,
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra
note 25, art. 50.  The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has also negotiated settle-
ments that included wide-ranging remedies and large compensatory damages.
34. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted and opened for signature
July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999.
35. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note
9, at 271.
36. According to Clifton Johnson, an attorney advisor at the U.S. State Department, “the
Convention specifically requires that States Parties exercise criminal jurisdiction over the un-
lawful and willful provision or collection of funds with the intention that they be used or in the
knowledge that they are to be used in order to carry out terrorist activity as defined in the Con-
vention.”  Clifton Johnson, Introductory Note to the International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of the Financing of Terrorism, 39 I.L.M. 268, 269 (2000).  The Convention also includes
provisions relating to “the freezing and seizure of funds used in the commission of the offense,
prohibiting mutual legal assistance requests from being refused on bank secrecy grounds.”  Id.
The Convention opened for signature on January 10, 2000, and was slated to remain open for
signature through December 31, 2001.  It was initially signed by seven states parties and requires
twenty-two parties to become effective.
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gage in terrorism financing.”37  Unfortunately, neither the Convention
nor any other remedy applies to states that finance or sponsor terror-
ist activities.  Pursuant to current international law, states remain im-
mune from criminal culpability for their sponsorship and financing of
terrorist acts.  Indeed, the revisions to the International Law Com-
mission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility completely exclude
the notion of state criminal responsibility.38
In addition to the range of criminal sanctions imposed on their
attackers, victims of state-sponsored terrorist acts and their families
may request that their own governments approach the offending gov-
ernment through diplomatic channels to seek compensation and the
arrest, extradition, or prosecution of the individuals or groups respon-
sible for terrorist acts.39  Alternatively, if the offending government
has voluntarily and explicitly waived its sovereign immunity with re-
spect to claims involving state sponsorship of terrorist acts, or con-
sented to the jurisdiction of certain regional or international human
rights tribunals, the victims and their families can, in some cases, seek
civil reparations from the state in these forums after exhausting avail-
able domestic remedies.40  As a practical matter, though, states that
sponsor terrorist acts rarely voluntarily and explicitly waive their sov-
ereign immunity.  Moreover, although many states are subject to the
jurisdiction of human rights tribunals, these proceedings often are un-
satisfactory because they are slow, the remedies available are largely
inadequate, and the decisions of most tribunals (with the notable ex-
ception of the International American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)) are
not legally binding.41  Figure 1 below summarizes available remedies
and demonstrates that victims of state-sponsored terrorism and their
families are left with few civil remedies and no effective criminal
remedies vis-à-vis the offending state sponsor of terrorist acts.42
37. Johnson, supra note 36, at 269.
38. Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Position of the Individual in International Law, 31 CAL.
W. INT’L L.J. 241, 266 (2001) (citations omitted); Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Report of
the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May–26 July 1996,
art. 20 cmt., U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1977/Add. (1996).
39. See DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 7 (1999).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 181–82.
42. For additional information concerning the various remedies available to victims of hu-
man rights abuses, see generally id.
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FIGURE 1
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO VICTIMS OF STATE-SPONSORED
ACTS OF TERRORISM
AGAINST STATE SPONSORS
OF TERRORISM
AGAINST INDIVIDUAL
TERRORISTS
CRIMINAL
REMEDIES
None available.
 Proposed International Criminal
Court.43
 Extradition to a country with
subject matter jurisdiction over the
act, personal jurisdiction over
defendant or (in some cases)
passive personal jurisdiction.
 Arrest and prosecution in domestic
courts of the state in which
terrorist act occurred.
CIVIL
REMEDIES
1. Only available if state:
 Consents to International
Court of Justice
jurisdiction;
 Signs certain regional
Human Rights treaties;
 Accepts suit pursuant to
social/political covenants;
 Waives sovereign
immunity for
international or regional
human rights tribunals.
2. Victim’s government can
approach state sponsor of
terrorist act seeking
compensation and/or
exercise diplomatic
protection.
1. Domestic remedies in state in
which terrorist act occurred.
2. Some domestic remedies are
available in countries with
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant and subject matter
jurisdiction of dispute.
3. No effective international civil
remedies against the individual
perpetrator. 44
III.  STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM: LEGISLATING
AN EXCEPTION TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE
UNITED STATES
Sovereign states historically enjoyed absolute immunity from
civil liability under international law for all actions.45  In fact, U.S.
43. Id. at 2 (noting that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is limited to a
small list of international crimes).
44. Id. at 2.
45. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1998) (citations omitted).
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courts interpreted the Supreme Court’s narrow holding in Schooner
Exchange v. M’Faddon,46 “as extending virtually absolute immunity to
foreign sovereigns.”47  Because the Schooner majority held that “for-
eign sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity on the part
of the United States, and not a restriction imposed by the Constitu-
tion,” federal courts historically have deferred to the executive
branch on the question of jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns.48
In the middle of the last century, largely pursuant to a document
known as the Tate Letter,49 the United States began to recognize the
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity, which permits civil
suits against foreign governments only on the basis of their commer-
cial activities,50 but application of the theory proved troublesome.
Prior to 1996, initial responsibility for deciding questions of sovereign
immunity fell primarily to the executive branch, and foreign nations
seeking immunity often placed diplomatic pressure on the U.S. State
Department.  Consequently, political considerations led to sugges-
tions of immunity where immunity should not have been available.
When foreign nations did not make such requests to the State De-
partment, the responsibility fell to courts to determine whether sov-
ereign immunity existed.  The courts then made decisions with refer-
ence to prior State Department decisions.51  Since determinations that
sovereign immunity should be recognized were made by two different
branches of government, governing standards were not clearly or uni-
formly applied.52
A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In 1976, the U.S. Congress adopted the FSIA, which codifies the
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity and transfers immu-
nity determinations from the Department of State to the judiciary.53
46. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
47. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (citations omitted).
48. Id. (citing Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586–90 (1943)).
49. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Acting Attor-
ney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London v. Re-
public of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976).
50. Id. (citing SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING ACTIVITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959)); see also W. Friedman, Changing Social Arrangements in State-
Trading States and Their Effect on International Law, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 350 (1959).
51. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States—A Proposal for Reform of
United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901, 909–12 (1969).
52. Id. at 906–09; see also Fredric Alan Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 1, 11–13, 15–17 (1976–1977).
53. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–11 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
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Under the Act, foreign state governments are generally immune from
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.  These governments are subject to a set
of specifically enumerated exceptions involving commercial activities
in or directly affecting the United States, as well as an exception for
actions where a foreign state has explicitly or implicitly waived its
immunity.54  The FSIA, however, does not extend to public acts com-
mitted outside of the United States, and foreign states can still invoke
sovereign immunity as a shield against civil liability for violations of
international law committed against U.S. nationals abroad.55  Today,
the only allowable bases for subject matter and personal jurisdiction
in an action against a foreign state defendant in U.S. courts remain
the FSIA’s enumerated exceptions to immunity.56
B. Amending the FSIA: The Antiterrorism Act and the Flatow
Amendment
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, U.S. courts found a num-
ber of foreign states to be immune from civil liability for the roles that
the states and their agents played in state-sponsored acts of terror and
violations of the law of nations.57  These decisions were rendered in a
variety of highly publicized cases and involved, inter alia, the Iranian
hostage crisis, the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, and the kidnappings
of Joseph Cicippio and others in Beirut.  Congress was doubly out-
raged, first by the many egregious acts of state-sponsored terror
committed against U.S. citizens abroad, and second by “the refusal of
the federal courts to find jurisdiction in cases such as Princz [v. Fed-
eral Republic of Germany], Rein [v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya], Cicippio [v. Islamic Republic of Iran], and [Saudi Arabia
54. Id.
55. Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 246 (2d Cir. 1996).
56. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1998) (citing Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989)); see also Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (holding federal courts lack jurisdiction over foreign state de-
fendants unless the circumstances of the case fall within one of FSIA’s enumerated exceptions
to foreign sovereign immunity).
57. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 355; Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 165 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (upholding dismissal of plaintiff’s claim on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Smith,
101 F.3d at 249; see also Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 799 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding
Chilean national airline’s assets were not subject to execution to satisfy judgment against Chile
in case of car bombing death of Chilean ambassador to the United States in Washington, D.C.
because the airline’s corporate status distinguished it from the Republic of Chile and because
Congress only provided for execution against the property of a foreign state in non-commercial
cases; “an act of political terrorism is not the kind of commercial activity that Congress contem-
plated.”).
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v.] Nelson and the progressive development of United States legisla-
tion and jurisprudence on the subject of jus cogens violations.”58  As a
result, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996 (Antiterrorism Act or Act), which “lifted the immu-
nity of foreign states for a certain category of sovereign acts
[deemed] . . . repugnant to the United States and the international
community—terrorism.”59  The Antiterrorism Act
created an exception to the immunity of those foreign states offi-
cially designated by the Department of State as terrorist states if
the foreign state commits a terrorist act, or provides material sup-
port and resources to an individual or entity which commits such an
act, which results in the death or personal injury of a United States
citizen.60  
In order to establish subject matter jurisdiction over a claim filed
pursuant to the Antiterrorism Act, seven statutory elements must be
satisfied:
(1) that personal injury or death resulted from an act of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking; and,
(2) the act was either perpetrated by the foreign state directly or by
a non-state actor which receives material support or resources
from the foreign state defendant; and,
(3) the act or the provision of material support or resources is en-
gaged in by an agent, official or employee of the foreign state
while acting within the scope of his or her office, agency or em-
ployment; and,
(4) that the foreign state be designated as a state sponsor of ter-
rorism either at the time the incident complained of occurred
or was later so designated as a result of such act; and
(5) if the incident complained of occurred within the foreign state
defendant’s territory, plaintiff has offered the defendants a rea-
sonable opportunity to arbitrate the matter; and
(6) either the plaintiff or the victim was a United States national at
the time of the incident; and
(7) similar conduct by United States agents, officials or employees
within the United States would be actionable.61
As the court noted in Estate of Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, “The
Antiterrorism Act merely waived the sovereign immunity of state
sponsors of terrorism.  To create a cause of action for victims of ter-
58. Flatow,  999 F. Supp. at 12 (citations omitted).
59. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. 1997)).
60. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. 1997)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 383 at 137–38
(1995).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2001), quoted in Flatow, 999 F. Supp at 15.
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rorism, Congress enacted a separate piece of legislation,”62 the Civil
Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism Act (Civil Liability
Act).63  This amendment to the FSIA, known as the Flatow Amend-
ment, also makes punitive damages available in actions brought under
the state-sponsored terrorism exception to immunity against subdivi-
sions and agents of foreign state defendants.64  Congress explicitly
made the statute retroactively applicable to pre-enactment conduct.65
As a result of the Antiterrorism Act, certain state sponsors of
terrorist acts already designated by the State Department as “terrorist
states,” which engage in terrorist acts against U.S. citizens abroad, are
no longer immune from civil lawsuits in the federal courts of the
United States.  In the years since the Act took effect, numerous
American victims of state-sponsored terror have filed civil lawsuits
against the governments of Iran, Libya, Cuba, and others, seeking
monetary and other relief for the extensive injuries and damages that
they and their families have sustained at the hands of the offending
government.
C. Recovering Damage Awards From Foreign States
Although a number of plaintiffs have been awarded large ver-
dicts in the years since the Act became law, successful plaintiffs have
encountered difficulties collecting money on their judgments from
foreign states, their agents, and their instrumentalities—at least until
very recently.  In an effort to address this problem, Congress enacted
a measure in October 1998, calling upon the U.S. Department of
State and the Treasury Department to assist victims of state-
sponsored terrorist acts in their efforts to locate money and other as-
sets to satisfy judgments.66  However, the 1998 legislation contained a
62. 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 106 (D.D.C. 2000) (“[T]he legislation provides a cause of action
against a foreign state and its agents for any act which would give a court jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7).”).
63. Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110
Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (2001)).  As the Elahi court notes, “although
this provision of the statute has been published as a note to 28 U.S.C. § 1605, it has been inter-
preted as being an ‘independent pronouncement of law.’”  Elahi, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 26 n.10
(quoting Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 12).
64. Elahi, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 113; Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 12
(D.D.C. 1998) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 863 (1996).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2001).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(2)(A) (2001).  Section 1610(f)(2)(A) states:
At the request of any party in whose favor a judgment has been issued with respect to
a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a)(7), the Secre-
tary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should make every effort to fully,
promptly, and effectively assist any judgment creditor or any court that has issued any
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“national security” waiver, which allowed the executive branch to re-
fuse such assistance in the interest of national security.67  Conse-
quently, the efforts of judgment holders to enforce their judgments
were often hampered by the executive branch and its statutory discre-
tion to block the collection of judgments obtained under the
Antiterrorism Act.68
On October 28, 2000, the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000 became law.69  The Act creates exceptions to
immunity from attachment or execution and obligates the U.S.
Treasury to allow the “plaintiffs in specifically designated lawsuits
against the Iranian government to recover an award of compensatory
damages from Iranian assets frozen by the United States govern-
ment.”70  Its sponsor in the Senate, Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, said
the bill would “strengthen our stand against terrorism” by acting as a
deterrent to attacks aimed at American citizens.71  The new legislation
makes monies due to the United States from any state against which a
judgment is pending under § 1605(a)(7) subject to attachment and
execution in like manner and to the same extent as if the United
States were a private person.72
As the following summary of the case law under the
Antiterrorism Act makes clear, most of the successful plaintiffs’
such judgment in identifying, locating, and executing against the property of that for-
eign state or any agency or instrumentality of such state.
Id.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(3) (2001) (“The President may waive any provision of paragraph
(1) in the interest of national security.”); see also, Senate Passes Bill on Terror Victims’ Lawsuits,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at A9.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(3) (2001)
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2001).
70. Estate of Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d  97, 109 (D.D.C. 2000) (cit-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2001)).  The Act provides:
The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603(a) of
this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune
from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a
court of the United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if—(1) the
foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution or from exe-
cution either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver
the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver, or . . . (7) the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not im-
mune under section 1605(a)(7), regardless of whether the property is or was involved
with the act upon which the claim is based.
28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1), (7) (2001).  The Act contains a nearly identical provision with respect to
the property in the United States of any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.  See 28
U.S.C. § 1610(b) (2001).
71. Senate Passes Bill on Terror Victims’ Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at A7.
72. Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f) (2001).
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claims under § 1605(a)(7) to date have been against the government
of Iran.  The new Act has enabled some of those plaintiffs to collect
on the judgments they have obtained against the Iranian government,
its ministries, and its agencies.  In fact, in the past year alone, since
the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention
Act, more than $410 million has been paid out to victims of state-
sponsored terror and their families.  The payments came from frozen
funds of state sponsors of terrorist acts, including Cuba and Iran.73
Notably, § 1610(f)(3) of the Act contains a national security
waiver provision which, in pertinent part, provides that “[t]he Presi-
dent may waive any provision of paragraph (1) in the interest of na-
tional security.”74  On October 28, 2000, the very day the new Act
took effect, President Clinton issued Presidential Determination No.
2001-03, in which he exercised his waiver authority with respect to §
1610(f)(1) of the Act.75  Section 1610(f)(1) provides that “any prop-
erty with respect to which financial transactions are prohibited or
regulated pursuant to” certain provisions of the Trading with the En-
emy Act,76 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,77 and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act,78 is subject to “execution or at-
tachment in aid of execution of any judgment relating to a claim for
which a foreign state . . . claiming such property is not immune [from
the jurisdiction of the U.S. federal or state courts] under §
1605(a)(7).”79  The Presidential Determination recites that §
1610(f)(1) “would impede the ability of the President to conduct for-
eign policy in the interest of national security and would, in particu-
lar, impede the effectiveness of such prohibitions and regulations
upon financial transactions.”80  Thus, the efficacy of the new Act in
terms of helping successful plaintiffs translate their judgments to dol-
lars has been mixed.
73. In the past year, since the passage of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Preven-
tion Act, more than $410 million has finally been paid out to victims of state-sponsored terror
and their families.  The payments came from frozen funds of state sponsors of terrorist acts, in-
cluding Cuba and Iran.  Thomas, supra note 7, at 22.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (f)(3) (2001).
75. Presidential Determination No. 2001-03, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,483 (Oct. 28, 2000).
76. 50 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1988).
77. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a) (1988).
78. 50 U.S.C. § 1701–02 (1988).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1) (2001).
80. Presidential Determination No. 2001-03, supra note 75.
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IV.  CASE LAW ARISING UNDER SECTION 1605(A)(7)
Since the Antiterrorism Act became law in 1996, a number of
U.S. citizens who were victims of state-sponsored terrorism and their
family members have filed civil lawsuits against the foreign states that
sponsored the terrorist acts from which they suffered.  To date, civil
judgments have been entered in reported cases against the govern-
ments of Cuba and Iran, and at least one federal court has held that
Libya may be sued by the families of the victims of the Pan Am flight
103 bombing.81  A careful examination of the major reported cases to
date under the Antiterrorism Act follows.
A. The Alejandre Case
In Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba,82 the personal representatives
of the estates of three U.S. citizens killed when their civilian airplanes
were shot down by Cuban Air Force planes in international airspace
over the Florida Straits filed suit against the Republic of Cuba and
the Cuban Air Force in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida.  These consolidated cases were the first
to rely upon the Antiterrorism Act.83  At the time of their deaths,
plaintiffs’ decedents were participating in a humanitarian mission on
behalf of a nongovernmental organization known as Brothers to the
Rescue,84 searching for emigrating rafters in the waters between Cuba
and the Florida Keys.85  Two Cuban Air Force airplanes, acting on di-
rect orders relayed via radio from their Cuban government-employed
superiors, used air-to-air missiles in two separate attacks to murder
the civilian pilots.  There was no provocation or warning for the at-
tack, and a subsequent investigation by the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization confirmed that the incident occurred over interna-
tional waters.86
Both the Republic of Cuba and the Cuban Air Force failed to
move, answer, or plead in response to the plaintiffs’ complaints, as-
81. Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998).
82. 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
83. Id. at 1242.
84. Brothers to the Rescue, also known as Hermanos al Rescate, is an organization “whose
principal mission was to search the Florida Straits for rafters, Cuban refugees who had fled the
island nation on precarious inner tubes or makeshift rafts, often perishing at sea.  Brothers to
the Rescue would locate the rafters and provide them with life-saving assistance by informing
the U.S. Coast Guard of their location and condition.”  Id. at 1243.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1247.
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serting through a diplomatic note that the U.S. district court lacked
personal jurisdiction over Cuba and its political subdivisions.87  A de-
fault judgment was entered against the defendants pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a); however, because the case in-
volved a foreign state, a default judgment could not be entered under
the FSIA until the case proceeded to trial.88
Following a trial in absentia at which the plaintiffs introduced ex-
tensive evidence, the district court concluded it had jurisdiction over
the suits pursuant to the “narrow exception to foreign sovereign im-
munity through the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996.”89  The district court wrote,
the FSIA now provides that a foreign state shall not be immune
from the jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in any case “in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death that was caused by an act of . . . extrajudicial killing . . . if
such act . . . is engaged in by an official, employee or agent of such
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, em-
ployment or agency.”90
The court concluded that all of the requirements of the statute were
met on the record before it: plaintiffs’ decedents were U.S. citizens
who were victims of an “extrajudicial killing” as that term is defined
in the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991;91 the Cuban Air Force
was acting as an agent of Cuba when it committed the killings;92 Cuba
had been continuously designated a state sponsor of terrorism by the
United States Congress under the Export Administration Act since
1979;93 and the acts in question occurred outside of Cuban territory.94
87. Id.
88. “In lawsuits against a foreign state, the court may not enter judgment by default.
Rather, the claimants must establish the claim or right to relief by evidence that is satisfactory to
the Court.”  Id. (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 1247.
90. Id. at 1247–48 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2001)).
91. The Torture Victim Protection Act defines an extrajudicial killing as “a deliberate
killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court af-
fording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”
Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3, 106 Stat. 73 (1992), quoted in Alejandre
v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1248 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
92. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1248.  The pilots of the Cuban airplanes obtained prior per-
mission from state officials before firing the deadly missiles, as the transcript of their radio
communications confirmed.
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, art. 3, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3).  The first plane was shot down “18 miles from the
Cuban coast,” and the second was “30.5 miles from the coast when fired upon, . . . well outside
of the twelve-mile territorial sea claimed by Cuba and permitted under international law.”  Id.
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As a result, the court held that “the facts of this case fall squarely
within the requirements of section 1605(a)(7).”95
The plaintiffs’ based their substantive cause of action on 28
U.S.C. § 1605, which “creates a cause of action against agents of a
foreign state that act under conditions specified in FSIA §
1605(a)(7).”96  The enforcement provision for § 1605(a)(7) provides
that if a plaintiff proves a foreign agent’s liability under the Act, then
“the foreign state employing the agent would also incur liability under
the theory of respondeat superior.”97  On that basis, the court found
that both the Cuban government and the Cuban Air Force were li-
able for the murders of plaintiffs’ decedents.  On the issue of dam-
ages, the court noted that the Civil Liability Act provides for agents
of foreign states to be held liable for money damages “which may in-
clude economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive
damages.”98
Based on an economist’s testimony regarding lost wages, bene-
fits, and services, as well as the testimony of decedents’ surviving
family members concerning their pain and suffering, the court
awarded the estate of plaintiff Armando Alejandre compensatory
damages in the amount of $17,532,913, the estate of Carlos Costa
$16,130,704 in compensatory damages, and the estate of Mario De La
Pena $16,264,294 in compensatory damages.99  In addition, the court
awarded each estate punitive damages against the Cuban Air Force
(as an agent of the Cuban government), recognizing that courts faced
with gross violations of international human rights in the context of
Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act cases had
previously awarded such damages as a means of punishing defendants
and deterring others from engaging in similar conduct.100  Noting that
the practice of summary execution has consistently been condemned
by the world community, and that “every instrument or agreement
95. Id.
96. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1249 (citing 28 U.S.C. §1605 (1997)).
97. Id. (citing Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 566 F. Supp. 1414, 1417 (D.D.C.
1983)).
98. Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 589, 110
Stat. 3009-172 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (2001)), quoted in Alejandre v. Republic
of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1249 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
99. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1249.
100. Id. at 1251 (“By granting large exemplary awards, courts have both expressed their
condemnation of human rights abuses and attempted to deter other international actors from
engaging in similar practices.  Most of these cases have been brought pursuant to the authority
of the Alien Tort Claims Act . . . and the . . . [Torture Victims Protection Act].”).
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that has attempted to define the scope of international human rights
has ‘recognized a right to life coupled with a right to due process to
protect that right,’”101 the court held that the ban on extrajudicial
killing rises to the level of “jus cogens, a norm of international law so
fundamental that it is binding on all members of the world commu-
nity.”102  Because the defendants’ conduct violated clearly established
principles of international law and constituted premeditated, inten-
tional, and “inhumane acts against innocent civilians,” the court
awarded punitive damages to the plaintiffs in an amount equaling ap-
proximately one percent the value of the Cuban Air Force’s fleet of
aircraft, or $45.9 million, for each of the three killings.103  Thus, the to-
tal judgment entered against the Cuban government in compensatory
and punitive damages for the three killings was $187,627,911.
B. The Terrorist Bombing Cases
1. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran.  In Flatow v. Islamic Re-
public of Iran,104 the estate of Alisa M. Flatow brought suit under 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia against the Islamic Republic of Iran, its Ministry of In-
formation and Security (MOIS), Ayatollah Ali Hoseini Khamenei,
Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Ali Fallahian-Khuzestani, jointly
and severally.  The plaintiff’s decedent, a twenty year old Brandeis
University student participating in an independent foreign study pro-
gram in Israel, died on April 10, 1995,105 in the Gaza Strip when a sui-
cide bomber drove a van loaded with explosives into the public bus
on which she was riding.106  As in Alejandre, the defendants failed to
move, answer, or plead in response to the plaintiff’s complaint,107 and
the court found them in default on September 4, 1997, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1608(e) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a).108  Noting
that the FSIA “requires that a default judgment against a foreign
state be entered only after plaintiff ‘establishes his claim or right to
relief by the evidence that is satisfactory to the Court,’”109 the court
conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing and issued a thirty-seven
page written decision.  The court held that the plaintiffs’ estate had
established its right to relief by “clear and convincing evidence suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie case in a contested proceeding.”110  The
101. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1252 (citing Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185 (D.
Mass. 1995).
102. Id. (citations omitted).
103. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1253.
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district judge concluded that the Shaqaqi faction of the Palestine Is-
lamic Jihad, the party that claimed responsibility for the suicide at-
tack killing Alisa M. Flatow, had in fact perpetrated the terrorist at-
tack.111  According to the court,
Palestine Islamic Jihad is a series of loosely affiliated factions rather
than a cohesive group.  The Shaqaqi faction is a terrorist cell with a
small core membership.  Its sole purpose is to conduct terrorist ac-
tivities in the Gaza region, and its sole source of funding is the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran.112
The court concluded that “Iran sponsors the Shaqaqi faction’s terror-
ist activities within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Section 1605(a)(7) and
28 U.S.C. Section 1605 . . . by providing it with all of its funding.”113
The court went on to hold that defendant MOIS, acting within the
scope of its agency on behalf of the Iranian government and as “a
conduit for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s provision of funds and
training to the Shaqaqi faction for its terrorist activities in the Gaza
Strip region,” caused the death of Alisa M. Flatow.114  Similarly, the
court held defendants Khamenei, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Fallahian-
Khuzestani responsible for causing the decedent’s death since they
“approved the provision of material support and resources to the
Shaqaqi faction of Palestine Islamic Jihad.”115  According to the court,
“Flatow’s death was caused by a willful and deliberate act of extraju-
dicial killing [within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7)] because
104. 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
105. Id. at 27.  Although the events complained of occurred more than a year prior to the
enactment of the Antiterrorism Act, the Act was explicitly given retroactive application by
Congress and the Flatow court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the action.  Id.
at 12; see 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (2001) (Retroactive Effect).
106. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting that
“United States nationals often rode this bus line”).
107. Id. at 6.  The court noted that service of process was accomplished on the defendants
with the assistance of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran on June 8, 1997, but as of the date on which
its decision was entered, March 11, 1998, no response had been received from the defendants.
Switzerland is the protecting power of the United States in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
108. Id.
109. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 6 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1994)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 8.  The court’s finding was based upon the testimony of Dr. Reuven Paz, Dr. Pat-
rick Clawson, and former FBI Deputy Assistant Director for Counterterrorism, Harry Brandon,
and was confirmed by the investigation of the Israeli government into the bombing.
112. Id. at 8.
113. Id.  According to the court, “the Islamic Republic of Iran provided approximately $2
million to Palestine Islamic Jihad annually in support of its terrorist activities.”  Id. at 9.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id. at 9–10.
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the explosion was caused by a bomb that was deliberately driven into
the bus by a member of the Shaqaqi faction of the Palestine Islamic
Jihad acting under the direction of [the] Defendants.”116  The court
noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a foreign state designated as
a sponsor of terrorism pursuant to the Export Administration Act of
1979117 and that it had been so designated since January 19, 1984.118
Judge Lamberth held that the routine provision of financial assistance
to a terrorist group in support of its activities constitutes “providing
material support or resources” for a terrorist act within the meaning
of the statute.119  He awarded the plaintiffs compensatory damages of
more than $1.5 million for loss of accretions,120 $1 million for the de-
cedent’s pain and suffering,121 and punitive damages of $225 million
(three times the amount of Iran’s annual expenditure for terrorist ac-
tivities).122
2. Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran.  On February 25, 1996,
less than a year after the tragic death of Alisa Flatow, another terror-
ist bomb in Israel claimed the lives of two more American students
pursuing graduate work there, Matthew Eisenfeld and Sara Rachel
Duker.123  The two were killed when one of their fellow passengers on
the Number Eighteen Egged bus in Jerusalem detonated explosives
he had carried onto the bus concealed in a travel bag.124  As in the
Flatow case, the administrators of the decedents’ estates and their
surviving immediate family members filed a wrongful death action
pursuant to the FSIA in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, naming as defendants the Islamic Republic of Iran
and various senior officials in the Iranian government, as well as the
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id. at 12 (citing 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j) (1994)).
118. Id. at 13.  The court also noted that Iran’s continued sponsorship of terrorism prompted
the United States to suspend diplomatic relations with Iran and participate in an international
embargo with trade restrictions.
119. Id. at 18.  The court concluded that plaintiffs need not prove that the material support
provided by a foreign state contributed directly to the act in order for subject matter jurisdiction
to lie, holding that “[s]ponsorship of a terrorist group which causes the personal injury or death
of a United States national alone is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction.”
120. Id. at 28.
121. Id. at 29.
122. Id. at 34.
123. Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. Civ. 98-1945 RCL, 2000 WL 1918779, at *2
(D.D.C. July 11, 2000).
124. Id.
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MOIS.125  Hamas, the popular name for the Islamic Resistance
Movement, immediately claimed credit for the attack.  This claim of
responsibility was further verified in statements given to the Israeli
police and on the television program 60 Minutes by Hassan Salamah,
the Hamas member who planned the attack.  Mr. Salamah was
trained at an Iranian base outside of Tehran for the bus attack for a
period of three months under the supervision of Iranian military in-
structors.  He was then sent to Israel following his training to carry
out a series of terrorist attacks, including the attack on the Number
Eighteen Egged Bus.  According to the court, the Islamic Republic of
Iran gave Hamas $15 million per month in support.126  The court
noted that Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism by
the U.S. government since 1984 pursuant to § 6(j) of the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1979127 and concluded that the defendants acted as
a conduit and provided funds within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(7), which, in turn, caused the deaths of Matthew Eisenfeld
and Sara Duker.128  Upon concluding that the elements of the Act had
been proven by the plaintiffs, the court awarded compensatory dam-
ages totaling $27,161,002 and punitive damages in the amount of $300
million.129
C. Iran and the Hostage Cases
Between 1983 and 1985, Lebanon was in a state of turmoil that
has been described as “effectively a state of civil war.”130  A number of
Americans and Western Europeans were kidnapped during this pe-
riod by various terrorist organizations funded or sponsored by the
Iranian government and its agencies.131  A number of those kidnapped
and their families subsequently filed suit under the FSIA against the
Islamic Republic of Iran, the MOIS, and various Iranian government
officials for training, funding, and supporting the terrorist organiza-
tions.
125. Id.
126. Id. at *3.
127. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(j) (1994).
128. Eisenfeld, 2000 WL 1918779, at *2.
129. Id. at *6.
130. Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32  (D.D.C. 2001).
131. Among those kidnapped were William Buckley, the local CIA station chief; Rev. Ben-
jamin Weir of the Episcopal Church; Fr. Lawrence Martin Jenco; Terry Anderson of the Asso-
ciated Press; and David Jacobson of the AUB Medical School.  Id. (citations omitted).
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1.  Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran.  In Cicippio v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, three U.S. citizens who were each separately kid-
napped, held hostage, and tortured in Beirut, Lebanon between 1985
and 1991, filed suit along with their spouses against the Iranian gov-
ernment pursuant to § 1605(a)(7).132  Although served with a copy of
the plaintiffs’ complaint,133 Iran did not move, answer, or plead in re-
sponse, and the court entered a default judgment against it.  As in
Alejandre and Flatow, the plaintiffs nevertheless were required under
28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) to establish their right to relief by evidence “satis-
factory to the Court,” and the case proceeded to a hearing on the
merits.134
The evidence adduced by the plaintiffs demonstrated that David
Jacobson, the CEO of American University of Beirut Medical Center
(held hostage for 532 days), Joseph Cicippio, comptroller of the
American University of Beirut and its hospital (held hostage for 1,908
days) and Frank Reed, the owner of two private schools in Lebanon
(held hostage for 1,330 days), were each independently abducted by
armed male assailants on public thoroughfares in Beirut.135  They were
held separately as prisoners in various locations throughout the city
and subjected to regular beatings, death threats, and interrogations.
At times they were held in solitary confinement, and all were re-
strained in chains and tortured.136  U.S. government and expert testi-
mony produced at trial identified their captors as members of
Hezbollah, a terrorist organization, and Iran as a recognized, state
sponsor of terrorist acts.137
The court held that Iran “openly provided ‘material support or
resources’ to Hezbollah,” and that
Plaintiffs have proved to the Court’s satisfaction: (1) that they were
injured by acts of torture and hostage-taking; (2) that the acts were
perpetrated by a group receiving material support from Iran; (3)
that the provision of material support was engaged in by Iranian of-
ficials, employees or agents acting within the scope of their office,
employment, or agency; (4) that at the time of the acts, Iran was
132. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 63–64 (D.D.C. 1998).
133. The government of Iran received service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) via
service on the Embassy of Switzerland in Tehran, Iran, which delivered the summons, com-
plaint, and notice of suit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran.  Id. at 67 n.4.
134. Id. at 67.
135. Id. at 64–66.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 64.  The court based its finding in part on the testimony of Col. David W. Hurley,
USMC, Director of Intelligence for the U.S. Marine Corps, and Dr. Patrick L. Clawson, Direc-
tor of Research, Washington Institute of Near East Policy.  See id. at 64 n.2.
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designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under 50 U.S.C. App.
Section 2405(j) or 22 U.S.C. Section 2371; (5) that the claimants or
victims were U.S. nationals at the time the acts occurred . . . and (6)
that similar acts conducted by officials, employees, or agents of the
U.S. while acting within the scope of [their] office, employment or
agency, would also be actionable.138
Notably, the court retroactively applied the Antiterrorism Act, hold-
ing that “although the abductions of Cicippio, Reed and Jacobsen oc-
curred more than a decade prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. Sec-
tion 1605(a)(7), Congress expressly directed that the statute be given
retroactive application.”139  The court also found that the ten-year
limitations provision in § 1605(a)(7) did not bar plaintiffs’ claims since
Congress expressly provided that victims of terrorism should receive
“all principles of equitable tolling, including the period during which
the foreign state was immune from suit.”140  Thus, even though the
acts giving rise to the suit occurred at a point in time when Iran was
immune from suit under the FSIA and before the law on which plain-
tiffs’ claims were based had been enacted, the court nevertheless
found the government of Iran liable.  The court awarded plaintiff Jo-
seph Cicippio $20 million for his pain, suffering, mental anguish, lost
wages, and lost business opportunities, as well as $10 million to his
spouse for her loss of her husband’s society, services, and companion-
ship.141  Frank Reed was awarded $16 million in compensatory dam-
ages, and his wife was awarded $10 million.  Plaintiff David Jacobsen
was awarded $9 million.142  No punitive damages could be awarded in
the case as they were precluded against foreign state defendants un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1606.143
2. Anderson v. the Islamic Republic of Iran.  In Anderson v. the
Islamic Republic of Iran,144 Terry Anderson, an American journalist
working as the chief correspondent for the Associated Press in Leba-
non, filed suit pursuant to § 1605(a)(7) against the Republic of Iran
and the MOIS in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
Mr. Anderson was kidnapped at gunpoint from his car in Beirut on
March 16, 1985, held hostage, imprisoned, and chained at various lo-
138. Id. at 68.
139. Id. at 68–69 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note (West Supp. 1997)).
140. Id. at 69 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(f)).
141. Id. at 70.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000).
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cations in and around Beirut for the next seven years under abhorrent
conditions.145  Like the plaintiffs in Cicippio, Anderson was threat-
ened with death and kept in unsanitary conditions in a war zone
throughout his ordeal.
Following a trial on the merits, at which the Iranian government
again neither appeared nor answered,146 Judge Thomas Penfield Jack-
son found conclusive evidence that Terry Anderson was “kid-
napped—and imprisoned under deplorable, inhumane conditions—by
agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran, known . . . most commonly as
Hezbollah, or ‘party of God.’”147  As in Cicippio, the court found that
all of the elements of § 1605(a)(7) had been satisfied by the evidence
before it.  The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and awarded
compensatory damages to Terry Anderson in the amount of $24.5
million; to his wife, Madeleine, in the amount of $10 million; and to
his daughter, Sulome, in the amount of $6.7 million.148  The court also
awarded punitive damages against the MOIS in an amount approxi-
mately three times its annual budget for terrorist activities, or $300
million.149
3. The Thomas Sutherland Case.  Less than three months after
Terry Anderson was kidnapped, another U.S. citizen, Dr. Thomas M.
Sutherland, the dean of the Faculty of Agricultural and Food Sciences
at the American University of Beirut, was similarly abducted by eight
members of Hezbollah brandishing submachine guns.150  The kidnap-
pers sideswiped and stopped Dr. Sutherland’s vehicle as he was re-
turning to his home from the airport.  He spent almost six and one-
half years imprisoned in dungeons throughout Lebanon without sun-
light; he attempted suicide three times.  He was the subject of horrific
physical abuse, beatings, and torture, as well as psychological abuse
and abhorrent living conditions; he was often chained to a floor or to
other hostages.151  Although he was released on November 18, 1991, it
was not until eight years later that Dr. Sutherland and his wife and
children filed suit against the Iranian government and the MOIS un-
145. Id. at 108.
146. Id. at 109 n.1.  As in Cicippio, service of process of the summons and complaint was
effectuated upon the Iranian government and the MOIS via the Swiss Embassy in Tehran.
147. Anderson, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
148. Id. at 113.
149. Id. at 114.
150. Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 33  (D.D.C. 2001).
151. Id. at 33.
HOYE_FMT.DOC 01/24/02  9:41 AM
2002] CIVIL REMEDIES AND THE NEW WAR ON STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM 131
der the FSIA.152  The defendants did not appear in the case.  Follow-
ing a bench trial, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e), the court issued
a twenty-four page ruling on June 25, 2001, concluding that the Ira-
nian government and the MOIS had supported the terrorist organiza-
tion that kidnapped Dr. Sutherland153 and that “Hezbollah, funded by
MOIS and Iran, was responsible for the kidnapping and captivity of
Thomas Sutherland.”154  According to the court, the defendants’ con-
duct constituted acts of “torture” and “hostage taking,” or the mate-
rial support for such acts, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(7).155  Therefore, the defendants were not entitled to immu-
nity under the FSIA and were civilly liable to the Sutherlands for bat-
tery, assault, false imprisonment, loss of consortium, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and loss of solatium.156  The plaintiffs were
variously awarded more than $53 million in compensatory damages,
as well as $330 million in punitive damages against the MOIS.157  In
setting the compensatory damage award for Dr. Sutherland, the court
stated explicitly that it was following a “formula which has evolved as
a standard in the hostage cases brought under § 1605(a)(7) . . . . This
formula grants the former hostage roughly $10,000 for each day of his
captivity.”158  To explain its use of such a formula, the court wrote:
Any skepticism about the adequacy of this formula must overcome
the steep presumption that Congress has tacitly approved its
use . . . . The formula was developed prior to October 28, 2000.  On
that day, Congress enacted the Victims of Trafficking and Violence
Protection Act of 2000.  The Act obligated the United States
Treasury to pay terrorist victims—including the hostages described
above—the amount awarded them at trial, or in other words, about
$10,000 per day of captivity.  Congress must be presumed to have
[been] aware of the damages formula, and its failure to amend it in
any way amounts to tacit approval of the scheme.159
152. Id. at 31.  Jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ complaint was predicated on 28 U.S.C. §§
1330(b), 1605(a)(7).
153. Sutherland, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 44 (“Since the 1980’s, MOIS has worked closely with
Hezbollah to support its terrorist activities in Lebanon.  For example, MOIS assisted Hezbollah
in collecting information about potential kidnapping targets and planning the prison networks
to hold the victims.”).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 45.
156. See id. at 50 ( “[W]hen an organization takes someone hostage, it is implicitly intending
to cause emotional distress among the members of that hostage’s immediate family.”).
157. See id. at 53.
158. Id. at 51.
159. Id. (citing Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972)).
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With respect to punitive damages, the court selected an amount three
times the annual funding provided by the Iranian government to
MOIS.  Noting that there had been no reported hostage taking inci-
dents involving Hezbollah and U.S. nationals since the U.S. courts
began awarding substantial punitive damage awards in these cases in
1998, the court stated that it is “not at all convinced that punitive
damages are wholly ineffectual.”160
4. The Rev. Lawrence M. Jenco Case.  Like the plaintiffs in An-
derson, Sutherland, and Ciccipio, Lawrence M. Jenco, a Catholic
priest and the Director of Catholic Relief Services in Lebanon, was
kidnapped by armed members of Hezbollah in 1985.161  He was de-
tained for 564 days, chained, beaten, and almost constantly blind-
folded.  His clothing and sanitary conditions were spartan at best, and
he was denied even the most basic medical care.  The psychological
torture he endured is best illustrated by the following example:
Most notably, at one point, his captors held a gun to his head and
told him that he was about to die.  The captors pulled the trigger
and laughed as Fr. Jenco reacted to the small click of the unloaded
gun.  At other times, the captors misled Fr. Jenco into thinking he
was going home.  They told him to dress up in his good clothes,
took pictures of him, and said ‘ha, ha, we’re just kidding.’162
After his release, Father Jenco returned to the United States, where
he served as a parish priest until he died on July 19, 1996.163  On
March 15, 2000, his brother, as personal representative of Father
Jenco’s estate, along with his five other siblings and twenty-two nieces
and nephews, filed suit against Iran and the MOIS under the
Antiterrorism Act.164  As in the cases cited above, the defendants
failed to move, answer, or plead in response to the plaintiffs’ com-
plaint and an evidentiary hearing was held in the form of a bench trial
to receive evidence from the plaintiffs.
Once again, the court concluded that the defendants funded,
supported, and controlled Hezbollah in the kidnapping, detention,
and torture of Father Jenco, and that the defendants were not entitled
to immunity under the Act.165  The court found the defendants liable
to the plaintiffs on various tort theories, including assault, battery,
160. Id. at 53.
161. Estate of Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 29 (D.D.C. 2001).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 33.
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and false imprisonment, as well as intentional infliction of emotional
distress, economic loss and loss of consortium.166  Notably, though, the
court only awarded damages to the Estate and to Father Jenco’s six
siblings.167  It refused to award damages to the priest’s nieces and
nephews, holding that “to collect for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress in cases such as this one, the plaintiff need not be pres-
ent at the place of outrageous conduct, but must be a member of the
victim’s immediate family.”168  Applying “the formula which has
evolved as a standard in hostage cases brought under section
1605(a)(7),” the court awarded the estate of Father Jenco approxi-
mately $10,000 for each day of his captivity, or $5,640,000.169  Father
Jenco’s six siblings were each awarded $1.5 million for their emo-
tional distress damages.170  In addition, the court awarded $300 million
in punitive damages, for a total judgment in excess of $314 million.171
D. The Iraqi Hostage Case: Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq
Between 1992 and 1995, three separate yet similar incidents oc-
curred in which the Iraqi government arrested, detained, and tortured
U.S. citizens doing business in Kuwait.172  In Daliberti v. Republic of
Iraq, the male victims and their spouses filed suit against the Iraqi
government under the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the
FSIA in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The parties sought damages for kidnapping, torture, false imprison-
ment, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium.  Unlike the cases
discussed above, the defendant in Daliberti appeared in the case, fil-
ing a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of personal
and subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim under
Rules 12(b)(1), (2), and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
respectively.173  The Iraqi government asserted that the FSIA gave it
immunity from suit and that none of the Act’s exceptions applied in
the case.174
166. Id. at 37.
167. Id. at 40.
168. Id. at 36.
169. Id. at 37.
170. Id. at 40.
171. Id. at 39.
172. Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 41 (D.D.C. 2000).
173. Id. at 40.
174. The Iraqi government also asserted that because it had insufficient contacts with the
United States, no U.S. court had personal jurisdiction over it, and that the complaint should be
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The court concluded that the defendant’s actions fell within a
category of conduct that Congress intended to exempt from FSIA
protection when it amended the FSIA to include an exception for
state-sponsored terrorism.175  The court further found that the male
plaintiffs were tortured and taken hostage as those terms are defined
under the Act.176  Therefore, the court held that the male plaintiffs
met their burden of proving that the actions of the defendants fell
within the state-sponsored terrorism exception to foreign sovereign
immunity under § 1605(a)(7).177
The court rejected Iraq’s argument that the state-sponsored ter-
rorism exception to the FSIA represented an unconstitutional legisla-
tive delegation of authority to the executive branch to determine the
federal courts’ jurisdiction, as well as the argument that the state-
sponsored terrorism exception violated Iraq’s due process right to
equal protection by discriminating against those sovereigns desig-
nated as state sponsors of terrorism.178  On the separation of powers
issue, the court wrote:
Iraq was already on the list of states designated as state sponsors of
terrorism at the time the AEDPA was enacted.  Thus, Congress,
not the Executive, actually made the determination that Iraq would
be subject to suit under the new FSIA exception, since Congress in
enacting the statute knew that, regardless of what the Secretary of
State might do in the future, the state-sponsored terrorism excep-
tion would apply to an identifiable group of sovereign states of
which Iraq was already a member.  ‘No decision whatsoever of the
Secretary of State was needed to create jurisdiction over
[Iraq] . . . .’  That jurisdiction existed the moment the AEDPA
amendment became law.179
On the equal protection issue, the court also rejected Iraq’s argument,
applying the rational basis test to conclude the following:
dismissed under the act of state doctrine.  Id. at 40.  See infra section IV for a detailed discussion
of these arguments.
175. For example, on September 12, 1990, the U.S. Department of State deemed Iraq a state
sponsor of terrorism.  Determination Iraq, 55 Fed. Reg. 37,793 (Sept. 13, 1990) (codified at 31
C.F.R. § 596.201 (2001); see Daliberti,  97 F. Supp. 2d at 44 (“No rescission of this designation
has been published pursuant to statute and Iraq remains so designated.”).
176. The FSIA adopted the definition of torture from the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991 and the definition of hostage taking from the International Convention Against the Taking
of Hostages.  See Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 45.
177. Notably, the court dismissed the female plaintiff spouses’ claims because they were not
pled under the commercial activity or the state-sponsored terrorism exceptions to the FSIA.  Id.
at 40.
178. Id. at 50–52.
179. Id. (citing Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748, 764 (2d Cir.
1998).
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Those nations that operate in a manner inconsistent with interna-
tional norms should not expect to be granted the privilege of im-
munity from suit that is within the prerogative of Congress to grant
or withhold.  The distinction made by Congress between those
states that have been designated as sponsors of terrorism and those
that have not is rationally related to its purpose of protecting U.S.
citizens by deterring international terrorism and providing compen-
sation for victims of terrorist acts.  28 U.S.C. Section 1605(a)(7)
does not violate the equal protection guarantees of the Due Process
Clause.180
The court held that the four male plaintiffs had established sufficient
grounds to allow their claims to proceed against Iraq under the state-
sponsored terrorism exception.181  The motion to dismiss as to the
male plaintiffs was denied, and their case was allowed to proceed to
trial.
E. Extrajudicial Killing: the Elahi case
In addition to waiving sovereign immunity for acts of state-
sponsored torture, hostage taking, and aircraft sabotage, § 1605(a)(7)
also waives sovereign immunity for certain acts of state-sponsored ex-
trajudicial killing.  In Estate of Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the
brother and personal representative of the estate of Cyrus Elahi filed
suit against Iran and the MOIS under the FSIA.182  Cyrus Elahi, a
naturalized U.S. citizen and Iranian dissident, was assassinated in
Paris on October 23, 1990 by agents of the Iranian government.183
Again, the defendants did not appear in the case.  Following a bench
trial, the court issued an eighteen page opinion, concluding that the
defendants were responsible for the extrajudicial killing of Dr. Elahi
as part of an Iranian government campaign to eliminate some of the
top leaders of its major opposition organizations.184  The court de-
nounced assassination as “clearly contrary to the precepts of human-
ity as recognized in both national and international law”185 and held
180. Id. at 52.
181. Id. at 55.
182. 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 99 (D.D.C. 2000).
183. Id.
184. The Act defines an extrajudicial killing as “a deliberated killing not authorized by a
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.  Such term, however, does not in-
clude any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of
a foreign nation.”  Id. at 107 (citing Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 3(a) (1992)).
185. 124 F. Supp. 2d at 107 (citations omitted); see also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp.
1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (“The proscription of summary execution or murder by the state
appears to be universal, is readily definable, and is of course obligatory.”); Xuncax v. Gramajo,
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Iran and the MOIS responsible under the FSIA for the wrongful
death of Cyrus Elahi.186  The court awarded the plaintiffs $11,740,035
in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages.
F. Analysis of Case Law
A number of common threads run through the case law discussed
above.  In nearly every case, the foreign state defendants and their
agents failed to file a motion, answer, or make an appearance in U.S.
courts.187  In fact, all but one of the cases filed under the Act to date
have proceeded on the basis of default judgments entered against for-
eign state defendants in absentia.  Consequently, only one defendant
has formally challenged the jurisdiction of U.S. courts under the
Antiterrorism Act, and/or the legality of the Act under international
law.  These challenges to the Act were soundly rejected by a U.S.
court.  As a result, a very unusual and lopsided body of case law has
developed under the Act, comprised almost entirely of unrefuted and
unchallenged evidence presented by plaintiffs in the cases.  Until a
more broadly based group of successful plaintiffs are able to collect
routinely on judgments awarded under the Act, without the extraor-
dinary and unusual remedy of special legislation, there seems to be
little incentive for foreign state defendants or their agents to appear,
much less to defend themselves aggressively, in Antiterrorism Act
cases.
On the other hand, in the wake of the tragic events of September
11, 2001, the mood in the United States seems to be one of unprece-
dented support for victims of state-sponsored terrorist acts and their
families.  At least twelve victims or their families have already an-
nounced their intent to sue Osama bin Laden and the Taliban.188
Since western governments had already located and frozen $300 mil-
lion in bin Laden’s and the Taliban’s assets just one month after the
attacks, it seems likely that the efficacy of the Act could rapidly im-
prove and a whole new body of case law might develop under the
Act.  The Taliban’s assets might then be utilized to satisfy judgments
in favor of the victims of September 11th.  However, it is unclear
886 F. Supp. 162, 185 (D. Mass. 1995) (“[E]very instrument and agreement that has attempted
to define the scope of human rights has ‘recognized a right to life coupled with a right to due
process to protect that right.’”).
186. Elahi, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 99–100.
187. The exceptions include Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000)
and Rein v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
188. Thomas, supra note 7, at 22.
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whether Afghanistan can be officially branded a state sponsor of ter-
rorism under the Act by the U.S. government.  The non-
governmental status of the Taliban in the eyes of the United Nations
and the U.S. government, as well as the Taliban’s recent loss of con-
trol over most of the territory of Afghanistan, calls into question
whether it is a “state” sponsor of terrorism or a non-state actor, for
purposes of the Act.  As noted above, 28 U.S.C. Section 1605(a)(7)
only applies to “foreign states” designated as state sponsors of ter-
rorism by the U.S. government.  If the Taliban regime is not a “for-
eign state” sponsor of terrorism within the meaning of the Act, or of-
ficially designated as such by the U.S. government, it may not be
subject to suit under the Act.  This unresolved threshold question of
law would need to be addressed before any civil lawsuits against the
Taliban would be possible under the Act.
Independent of these issues, the fact remains that all decisions
under the Act are made by the courts of the United States, solely to
protect its own citizens against actions by other states.  This common
theme in all of the cases under the Act might lead citizens of foreign
states and other governments to question the fairness, objectivity, and
credibility of the decisional law that has developed or will develop in
this context.  The next two sections of this Article examine the Act’s
efficacy, as well as its legality under international law.
V.  LEGALITY OF THE ANTITERRORISM ACT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although several federal courts in the United States have en-
forced the provisions of the Antiterrorism Act, the legality of the Act
under principles of international law has not yet been adequately
tested or fully litigated in an adversary proceeding.  The Act seems
susceptible to challenge under principles of customary international
law on at least three fronts: (1) as a violation of the sovereignty rights
of foreign states; (2) as a violation of the ‘act of state’ doctrine; and
(3) as a violation of the principle of reciprocity.  Each of these issues
is addressed below.
A. Foreign State Sovereignty
The legislative scheme created by Congress in the Antiterrorism
Act might infringe upon the sovereign rights of those foreign states
unilaterally labeled as state sponsors of terrorism by the United
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States government.189  Under customary international law, sovereign
governments are immune from civil suit, except to the extent that
they expressly have waived their immunity.190  While the FSIA is
premised upon a rationale that state sponsors of terror have impliedly
waived their rights to immunity by engaging in gross violations of
human rights against U.S. citizens abroad (i.e., through de facto viola-
tions of alleged jus cogens norms191 of international law), it has long
been recognized by various U.S. federal courts that “a waiver of a
state’s sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed and
never implied.”192  In fact, in a number of pre-Antiterrorism Act cases,
federal courts stated that “the fact that there has been a violation of
jus cogens does not confer jurisdiction under the FSIA.”193  This ar-
gument does not appear to have been raised or tested in a single re-
ported case since the Act became law.  Furthermore, research has not
revealed any legal authority under which international law would
permit one state to brand another sovereign state a sponsor of ter-
rorism unilaterally and declare its own domestic courts as the final
arbiter of victim compensation for acts of terrorism sponsored by the
branded terrorist state.  This lack of authority is particularly relevant
where the terrorist act, by definition, occurred outside the borders of
the state providing the legal remedy.  States can and often do call one
another names and protest—politically, diplomatically, and some-
times even publicly—particular acts of other states.  However, the no-
tion of one state imposing domestic legal remedies upon another state
for such behavior is largely without precedent, especially where, as
here, there does not appear to have been an express waiver of immu-
nity by the foreign state with respect to the conduct in question.
189. As used here, sovereignty means, “a state’s lawful control over its territory generally to
the exclusion of other states, authority to govern in that territory, and authority to apply law
there . . . . The sovereignty of a state is reflected also in immunity for the state and its public
property from certain exercises of authority by other states.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206 cmt. (b) (1987).
190. Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 321 (D.D.C. 1988) (citing United States v.
Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)).
191. “A jus cogens norm is a principle of international law that is ‘accepted by the interna-
tional community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted . . . .’”
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331).
192. Saltany, 702 F. Supp. at 321.
193. See, e.g., Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174 (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,
965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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The international law doctrine of sovereign equality suggests
states are both sovereign and equal.194  Under this libertarian princi-
ple, one state may not impose its sovereign will upon another sover-
eign state.195  As a result, under customary international law, as ar-
ticulated by the International Court of Justice in the Lotus case,
sovereign states are empowered to do anything that they have not
agreed to refrain from doing.196  The doctrine of sovereign equality
thus calls into question the legality of the Antiterrorism Act pursuant
to international law.  The doctrine could be used to characterize the
Act as an unlawful attempt by one state to abrogate unilaterally the
immunity of another sovereign state without that state’s express or
implied consent.
B. Act of State Doctrine
A second basis on which the legality of the Antiterrorism Act is
subject to challenge under international law is the act of state doc-
trine.  Although not a doctrine of customary international law, the act
of state doctrine is a recognized matter of etiquette or comity be-
tween and among sovereign states.  It is based upon the principle that
[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory.  Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through means open to be availed of by sov-
ereign powers as between themselves.197
Historically, “[t]he act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation
preclude[d] the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity
of the public acts of a recognized foreign sovereign power committed
within its own territory.”198  The doctrine is not mandated by the U.S.
Constitution, however, and many courts have refused to adhere to it
where the issue or question of law before a court is well-settled and
universal (e.g., in cases involving the Holocaust, where the laws gov-
194. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); see also Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq,
97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 55 (D.D.C. 2000) (“This doctrine ‘directs United States courts to refrain from
deciding a case when the outcome turns upon the legality or illegality . . . of official action by a
foreign sovereign performed within its own territory.’” (quoting Riggs Nat’l Corp. & Subsidiar-
ies v. Comm’r of IRS, 163 F.3d 1363, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1999))).
198. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964).
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erning the prohibition of genocide are universally recognized under
customary international law).199
Because the prohibition against terrorism seems well-settled and
is perhaps universal, especially in cases involving state-sponsored at-
tacks on civilians, it seems less likely that a court would adhere to the
act of state doctrine as a judicially self-imposed means of restraint.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the act of state
doctrine in appropriate circumstances, expressing its rationale as fol-
lows:
The doctrine . . . expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch
that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of
goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in
the international sphere. . . . Its continuing vitality depends on its
capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the
judicial and political branches of the Government on matters
bearing upon foreign affairs.200
Where the executive branch has expressed a willingness for the judi-
ciary to act, the Supreme Court has declined to adhere blindly to the
act of state doctrine.201  In fact, in Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq,202 the
court soundly rejected the argument of the defendant Iraqi govern-
ment that the act of state doctrine required the dismissal of the plain-
tiffs’ claims under the FSIA, writing:
While the act of state doctrine seeks to prevent courts from inter-
fering in the foreign affairs powers of the President and the Con-
gress, it does not prohibit Congress and the Executive from using
the threat of legal action in the courts as an instrument of foreign
policy.  The designation of Iraq as a terrorist state was made by the
Secretary of State on behalf of the Executive Branch under an ex-
press grant of authority by Congress.  For this Court to grant de-
fendant’s motion to dismiss on act of state grounds would constitute
more of a judicial interference in the announced foreign policy of
the political branches of government than to allow the suit to pro-
ceed under the explicit authorization of Congress.203
199. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 870 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443(a) cmt. (c) (“[A] claim arising out of an alleged
violation of fundamental human rights—for instance, a claim on behalf of a victim of torture or
genocide—would (if otherwise sustainable) probably not be defeated by the act of state doc-
trine, since the accepted international law of human rights is well established and contemplates
external scrutiny of such acts.”)).
200. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401.
201. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972).
202. 97 F. Supp. 2d at 54–55 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
203. Id. at 55.
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Thus, the court concluded that the political branches of the U.S. gov-
ernment (the executive and legislative branches) have expressed
willingness for the judicial branch to act in this arena.
It remains unclear whether the act of state doctrine might be in-
voked successfully under the Antiterrorism Act when the executive
branch and Congress are not in agreement.  For example, an individ-
ual plaintiff may attempt to enforce a judgment obtained pursuant to
§ 1605(a)(7) against the assets of a state sponsor of terrorism at a time
when the President of the United States is attempting to normalize or
restore diplomatic relations with the foreign state.  It seems plausible
that a U.S. court might invoke the doctrine under such circumstances
in order to avoid interfering with the national interest and the ability
of the executive branch to conduct foreign policy.
In any event, the conduct of foreign state defendants outside of
their borders, such as the sponsorship of terrorist organizations by
Iran in Lebanon and the shooting down of civilian planes by the Cu-
ban Air Force in international airspace, is beyond the scope of the act
of state doctrine and subject to adjudication by the U.S. courts, unless
U.S. courts were to conclude that the decision to fund terrorist groups
or shoot down unarmed civilian planes made within the territory of
the foreign state is sufficient to justify application of the doctrine.204
The application of the act of state doctrine and its full breadth in the
context of the Antiterrorism Act have not been fully defined by the
single reported case in which a foreign state defendant has raised the
issue before a U.S. court.  The doctrine would seem to remain, there-
fore, a potential impediment to the legality of the Act under the law
of nations.
C. Reciprocity
A third basis on which the legislative scheme underlying the
Antiterrorism Act might be challenged under international law in-
volves a principle of comity known as reciprocity.  Broadly stated,
“[t]he concept of reciprocity in the international law context is that a
U.S. court should recognize non-U.S. proceedings only when a non-
U.S. forum would recognize U.S. proceedings.”205  In the United
States, the concept stems from the 1895 case of Hilton v. Guyot,206 in
which the Supreme Court held that a judgment of a French court was
204. See, e.g., Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
205. 6A WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 152–18
(1997) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 234 (1895)).
206. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 234 (1895).
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only “prima facie evidence” of the plaintiff’s claims because if the
situation had been reversed, the French courts would only have
treated a U.S. judgment in the case as prima facie evidence.  Al-
though reciprocity is not essential for granting comity to foreign legal
proceedings today, it remains a relevant factor to be considered by
the U.S. courts.207
While the situation under the Antiterrorism Act seems unlike
the circumstances that the court faced in Hilton, as foreign govern-
ments like Iran and Cuba are essentially being asked to recognize
U.S. legal proceedings in cases such as Flatow, Cicippio, Anderson,
Sutherland, Jenco, and Alejandre, the principle of reciprocity seems
equally applicable.  Given the behavior of the defendant govern-
ments, as well as their public statements and legal arguments assert-
ing the U.S. courts’ lack of jurisdiction,208 the defendant governments
do not appear to recognize the U.S. proceedings in the aforemen-
tioned cases.  Furthermore, the U.S. courts undoubtedly would be
loathe to recognize domestic legal proceedings or judgments of the
Iranian or Cuban courts in similar cases, especially if they were
premised upon branding the U.S. government a state sponsor of ter-
rorism, in addition to a subsequent finding that the U.S. government
was liable for sponsoring specified terrorist acts.  For example, U.S.
courts would likely deny recognition of proceedings conducted in the
domestic courts of Chile for the alleged role of the CIA in the assas-
sination of former Chilean president Salvador Allende in 1973.  U.S.
courts would likely refuse to afford full faith and credit to the legal
207. Id.
208. In Alejandre, the diplomatic note filed with the court contested the court’s personal
jurisdiction over Cuba.  996 F. Supp. at 1242.  In Daliberti, the defendant government of Iraq
challenged via a motion to dismiss the personal jurisdiction of a federal court with respect to the
FSIA, arguing that the state-sponsored terrorism exception to the FSIA violated due process by
abrogating the ‘minimum contacts’ requirement necessary for the assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion.  97 F. Supp. 2d at 42.  The court rejected that argument, concluding that “Congress ex-
pressly addressed the minimum contacts requirement in enacting the FSIA by providing that
‘[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the
district courts have jurisdiction,’ pursuant to the exceptions of the FSIA, and where service has
been made.”  Id. at 53 (citations omitted).  “Under the FSIA, therefore, personal jurisdiction
equals subject matter jurisdiction plus valid service of process.”  Id.  The court characterized the
FSIA as a “federal long-arm statute over foreign states,” with the minimum contacts require-
ment embodied in it, since “each of the immunity provisions in the bill, sections 1605–07, re-
quires some connection between the lawsuit and the United States, or an express or implied
waiver by the foreign state of its immunity from jurisdiction.”  Id.  The court found it reasonable
for foreign states to be held accountable in U.S. courts for terrorist acts committed anywhere
against U.S. citizens, and that the detention of the plaintiffs in Iraq had direct and intended ef-
fects in the United States.  Id. at 54.
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proceedings brought in a Chinese court by the surviving family mem-
bers of bombing victims against the U.S. government and its air force
for their roles in the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Sarajevo in
1999.  Actions such as seizure of U.S. diplomatic or other property in
China to satisfy such a judgment would strain already tense U.S.-Sino
relations.  Under the principle of reciprocity, however, if the United
States expects other states to recognize its legal proceedings under
the Antiterrorism Act, the United States must be prepared and will-
ing to recognize foreign domestic legal proceedings against the U.S.
government.
Each of the above examples would first require that the foreign
states involved adopt a domestic statutory scheme akin to the U.S.
Antiterrorism Act, and that they brand the U.S. government a state
sponsor of terrorism.  Even under the U.S. statutory scheme, the
creation of such domestic rights and remedies against foreign states,
even years after the incidents giving rise to them occurred—as was the
case in the Anderson, Cicippio, Sutherland, Jenco, Elahi, Eisenfeld,
and Flatow cases—has not proved problematic for U.S. courts.  The
courts have applied the statutes retroactively against the defendant
foreign states and their agencies and instrumentalities.  In fact, in the
Anderson case, the Antiterrorism Act was passed some eleven years
after the initial kidnapping of plaintiff Terry Anderson in Beirut.  On
the date of the kidnapping, the defendants enjoyed undisputed and
absolute immunity from civil liability under U.S. law and could not
have been successfully sued under the FSIA (as numerous pre-1996
cases demonstrated).209  Under similar circumstances, it seems highly
unlikely that U.S. courts would recognize a foreign state’s legal pro-
ceedings.
In the final analysis, although the doctrine of reciprocity has
been substantially eroded in recent years, it seems reasonable and fair
under what remains of the doctrine to conclude that if the U.S. gov-
ernment expects other countries to recognize its Antiterrorism Act,
U.S. courts should be prepared to recognize similar domestic reme-
dies enacted by foreign states.  The U.S. government also should be
prepared to expose or submit its property abroad to execution, at-
tachment, garnishment, or seizure for U.S. acts defined and perceived
abroad as acts of state-sponsored terrorism.  If it is not willing to do
209. See, e.g., id. at 11 (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 434–35 (1989)); see also Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (noting that fed-
eral courts lack jurisdiction unless one of FSIA’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity applies).
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so then it should not expect reciprocal behavior from other sovereign
states under the Antiterrorism Act.  Given the aforementioned issues,
perhaps the U.S. government should consider yielding to an inde-
pendent international tribunal’s adjudication of such claims, rather
than relying upon a determination of liability by its own courts.
The legality of the U.S. Antiterrorism Act under international
law is open to legitimate question, especially under the doctrines of
reciprocity, sovereignty, and the act of state doctrine.  Even in the ab-
sence of these legitimate and substantial unanswered questions under
international law, there remains the issue of whether the Act is even
an appropriate or effective means of combating state-sponsored ter-
rorism.  This issue will be discussed in the following section.
VI.  IS THE ANTITERRORISM ACT AN APPROPRIATE OR
EFFECTIVE MEANS OF FIGHTING STATE-SPONSORED
TERRORISM?
Assuming that the Antiterrorism Act is legal under customary in-
ternational law, the question remains as to whether it is an effective
or appropriate means of combating state-sponsored terrorism in the
twenty-first century.  The effectiveness of the Act largely depends
upon the definition of effectiveness one employs and upon the aims
of the Act itself.  For example, if a primary goal of the Act is to com-
pensate victims of state-sponsored terror and their families, then it
seems to have had mixed effectiveness to date.  Many successful
plaintiffs have experienced years of difficulty collecting on the judg-
ments rendered under the Act.  However, to the extent that one goal
of the Act is to publicly shame foreign state defendants that commit
or sponsor acts of terror, and to draw media and public attention to
the heinousness of their acts, the statute appears to be effective.  The
filing of each case under the Act, and the judgments entered, have led
to national and international news stories.  Similarly, if a goal of the
Act is to provide victims of state-sponsored terror with their day in
court or an opportunity to publicize the atrocities committed against
them, then the Act has been effective.
If, however, a goal of the Act is to punish state sponsors of terror
and to force them to deplete their national treasuries by paying large
judgments to atone for their misdeeds, then the Act has not been ef-
fective until very recently, and then only with respect to two govern-
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ments with frozen assets in the United States (Iran and Cuba).210  Ad-
ditionally, if a primary purpose of the Act is to deter foreign states
from engaging in state-sponsored terror under threat of public shame
or the obligation to pay large verdicts to successful plaintiffs, then the
Act’s effectiveness would seem to be mixed.  Most foreign state de-
fendants have deep pockets, yet collection efforts have been difficult,
time consuming, and only occasionally successful to date, and then
largely through special legislation.211
One cannot know or measure how many foreign states, if any,
have decided to forego engaging in acts of terrorism since the
Antiterrorism Act became effective.  As noted above, several courts
have suggested that large punitive damage awards in cases handed
down under the Act during the past three years are at least partially
responsible for the Iranian government and MOIS refraining from
further support for hostage-taking by certain terrorist organizations.212
Of course, it is impossible to know whether the verdicts led to this
apparent change in behavior, and if so, to what extent.
If a goal of the politicians who sponsored and passed the
Antiterrorism Act was to create a system which appears to the
American public to “get tough” on state-sponsored terrorism, while
providing a forum for victims to air their grievances and publicize
their cases (irrespective of whether the judgments they obtain are ul-
timately collectible), then the Act appears to be quite successful.
Many plaintiffs now have had their day in court and a number of
multimillion dollar verdicts have been returned.213  Those judgments
210. See, e.g., Estate of Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 109 n.15
(D.D.C. 2000) (“Recently enacted amendments to the FSIA allow plaintiffs in specifically des-
ignated lawsuits against the Iranian government to recover an award of compensatory damages
from the Iranian assets frozen by the U.S. government.” (citing Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 2002(a)–
(c) (2000))).
211. See, e.g., Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. Civ. 98-1945 RCL, 2000 WL
1918779, at *7 (D.D.C. July 11, 2000) (“The Court is aware of this date that the Flatow plaintiffs
have been unable to collect on their judgment. . . .”).
212. See, e.g., Sutherland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 53 (D.D.C. 2001)
(“[T]he court is not at all convinced that punitive damages are wholly ineffectual.”); see also Es-
tate of Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F. Supp. 2d 27, 39 (D.D.C. 2001) (“[P]revious cases
awarding punitive damages against MOIS have only been decided in the past three years.  Since
that time, there have been no reported hostage incidents involving Hizbollah and U.S. nation-
als.”).
213. See generally Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107, 114 (D.D.C.
2000); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (D.D.C. 1998); Daliberti, 146 F.
Supp. 2d at 24; Eisenfeld, 2000 WL 1918779, at *6; Elahi, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 114; Flatow v. Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1998); Jenco, 154 F. Supp. at 39; Sutherland v.
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have been rendered against governments that are extremely unpopu-
lar in the United States, such as those of Cuba, Iraq, and Iran, and
with which the U.S. government has little apparent desire to normal-
ize relations—at least until after their present governments leave
power.  Thus, the Act has effectively deflected  public pressure to
take action against state-sponsored terrorism away from U.S. politi-
cians.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to know or identify all of the goals
underlying the Antiterrorism Act.  The goals may have varied among
members of Congress who voted to adopt the Act, and between Con-
gress and the President when he signed it into law.  Nevertheless, un-
til a number of successful plaintiffs are able to collect on the massive
judgments entered to date, not only via special legislation using fro-
zen assets held by the U.S. government, but also from assets held by
the foreign state defendants themselves, it would be difficult to judge
the Act an overall success from the standpoint of its stated purposes
of compensating victims, punishing wrongdoers, and deterring poten-
tial state sponsors of terror.
Even if the Act is deemed effective, one still might question
whether it is an appropriate normative tool for combating state-
sponsored terrorism.  The Act may be an example of fighting fire with
the mire of years of litigation and procedural wrangling.  By unleash-
ing lawyers, lawsuits, procedural rules, delay, and other characteristics
of American-style tort litigation on foreign state defendants, one
might argue that the United States government has partially abro-
gated its own governmental responsibility to fight state-sponsored
terrorism, and to obtain justice and compensation for its victims and
their families.  In fact, it is arguable that the unilateral victim compen-
sation system represented by the Act interferes with, and perhaps
even undermines, the art of diplomacy that otherwise could be re-
sponsible for resolving issues of state-sponsored terror between and
among sovereign states.
A unilateral approach to victim reparations by a single country,
even if appropriate, can give unfair advantages or disadvantages
based upon citizenship and nationality to parties who file suit.  Do-
mestic laws often vary widely with respect to the availability of statu-
tory attorneys fees, court costs, contingent fee arrangements, and pu-
nitive damage awards to successful plaintiffs.214  For example, while
Islamic Republic of Iran, 151 F. Supp. 2d 27, 53 (D.D.C. 2001); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba,
996 F. Supp. 1239, 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
214. See generally SHELTON, supra note 39, at 306.
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many international, human rights, and domestic tribunals around the
world do not allow prevailing parties to recover their attorneys fees
and court costs, they sometimes are awarded by national systems.215
Such factors can create important advantages for those victims filing
suit in one particular country over those who file in other countries or
forums.  Special U.S. legislation affording relief to particular plaintiffs
in specified cases seems to create a fundamental inequity between vic-
tims of terrorist acts sponsored by a foreign state like Iran, and vic-
tims of terrorist acts sponsored by other states such as Afghanistan,
Iraq, Libya, or Cuba.  Certain legislation may even lead to unequal or
inconsistent treatment of those victims of terrorist acts supported or
funded by Iran.
One could argue that the Antiterrorism Act is merely one arrow
in the quiver of the U.S. government in its fight against state-
sponsored terrorism.  In addition to the remedies provided in the
Antiterrorism Act, diplomatic, foreign policy, and military efforts by
the government remain available and are currently being used in or-
der to punish wrongdoers and deter states from engaging in state-
sponsored terrorism.216  Such a rationale does not, however, negate
potential conflicts that remain between the Act’s judicial remedies
and those remedies available to the President as the final arbiter of
U.S. foreign policy.  For example, the Act’s legislative scheme could
place the interests of a few victims of state-sponsored terrorist acts
and their families above, or at least in conflict with, the larger foreign
policy interests and goals of the U.S. government.  For example, if the
successful plaintiffs in Ciccipio, Anderson, Jenco, Sutherland, Eisen-
feld, Elahi, and Flatow are attempting to collect their judgments
against the government of Iran, and the President of the United
States is attempting to restore trade relations with Iran, the plaintiffs’
legal attempts to enforce their judgments under the Act and the for-
eign policy interests of the United States could be in direct conflict.
Iran could insist on the suspension or dismissal of the proceedings be-
fore agreeing to improve or normalize relations, allowing the interests
of a handful of plaintiffs, albeit very deserving plaintiffs, to slow or
possibly even prevent the ability of two states to restore friendly and
effective relations.  Alternatively, that determination could remain in
the hands of the President, who is constitutionally charged and solely
empowered to speak for the nation in the area of foreign affairs,
215. Id.
216. See id. at 358–61.
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rather than in the hands of the legislative branch, the judicial branch,
or a group of plaintiffs and their lawyers.217  To the extent that the
Antiterrorism Act impedes or hinders the foreign policy interests of
the U.S. or elevates the individual interests of a few plaintiffs above
the national interest, this statutory scheme may not be the most ap-
propriate tool for combating state-sponsored terrorism.
Another potential problem with the Antiterrorism Act involves
the issue of collateral estoppel and the protection of the fundamental
rights of individual criminal defendants accused of committing acts of
state-sponsored terrorism.  For example, if an alleged act of state-
sponsored terror were adjudicated in a civil action under the
Antiterrorism Act, those same facts and circumstances may be
deemed finally adjudicated under the doctrine of collateral estoppel
in a subsequent domestic or international criminal proceeding against
an individual charged with committing the underlying act of terror-
ism.  As a result, the domestic civil proceedings conducted pursuant
to the Act might adversely impact the fundamental constitutional
rights of the accused criminal defendant.
Although some might argue that civil proceedings should have
this effect, it would seem that this problem and the others identified
above could be avoided almost entirely if the Antiterrorism Act’s
domestic proceedings were replaced with an international tribunal
that merges criminal remedies and civil remedies into a single pro-
ceeding before an independent international court.  Perhaps the best
example of such an approach is found in Article 75 of the Rome Stat-
ute for the proposed International Criminal Court (ICC).218  The ICC
merges criminal and civil remedies into a single proceeding before a
single forum: a single tribunal will adjudicate criminal culpability,
punishment, and victim compensation for alleged international
crimes.  If the same approach were taken with respect to acts of state-
sponsored terror, by expanding the jurisdiction of the envisaged ICC
to provide civil and criminal remedies for international terrorist acts,
the potential conflict between the rights of the victims and the rights
of the accused, as well as the preclusive effect of one proceeding on
217. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 614–15 (1988) (“[W]e have also recognized ‘the very
delicate, plenary, and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal govern-
ment in the field of international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress.’” (citing U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936))).
218. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 34.
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another, could be avoided completely without depriving any party of
its legal rights or its day in court.
Instead of relying upon a system designed unilaterally by one
sovereign state to compensate only its own citizens, what is needed is
a credible, independent, and global compensation system, established
by multilateral treaty, to adjudicate claims and to compensate all vic-
tims of human rights violations arising out of state-sponsored terrorist
acts.  Such a system, if appropriately designed, could avoid the inter-
national law pitfalls previously discussed.  It could also help avoid the
potential problem of elevating individual plaintiffs’ interests above
the interests of a single state, as well as avoiding the possibility of
limiting a state chief executive’s control of foreign policy.  Such a sys-
tem, of course, would require the cooperation and support of states
around the world.  This may prove difficult if not impossible.  How-
ever, such a system clearly would be far more efficient, legitimate,
and equitable to victims of state-sponsored terrorism than the unilat-
eral system adopted by the United States in the Antiterrorism Act.
Because the ICC is already envisaged and enjoys the imprimatur of
the international community (as of this writing, 47 states, excluding
the U.S., have ratified the ICC treaty),219 the jurisdiction of the ICC
should be expanded to include adjudication of victim reparations and
criminal penalties for state-sponsored acts of terrorism, rather than
attempting to create a completely new and separate international tri-
bunal to compensate victims of state-sponsored terror.220
219. As of December 5, 2001, 139 states were signatories to the treaty, and forty-seven had
completed ratification.  Many more are in the process of ratification.  Sixty ratifications are re-
quired for the ICC to come into existence.  Updated information on the status of ratification can
be found on the website of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court at
http://www.igc.org/ icc/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2001).
220. Although the Rome Statute only deals with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity, Resolution E, adopted at the end of the 1998 Rome Conference, contained a pledge
on the part of the signatories to the Statute to continue to discuss the crimes of drug trafficking
and terrorism, and to consider these crimes for inclusion in the Statute at the seven-year Review
Conference.  See Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Res. E, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/10
(1998).  Alternatively, it has been argued that a terrorist attack that is the result of a “wide-
spread or systematic attack” against a civilian population, pursuant to a state or organizational
policy, may constitute a crime against humanity, and thus perpetrators could be prosecuted un-
der Article 7 of the ICC Statute.  See, e.g., GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 335–336 (1999); see also Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, supra note 34, at art. 7.
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VII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The statutory scheme created by the U.S. Congress when it
adopted the Antiterrorism Act as an exception to the FSIA is based
upon the laudable goal of deterring international terrorism and com-
pensating victims of human rights abuses arising out of state-
sponsored terrorist acts.221  However, the legality of the Act under in-
ternational law is open to question.  Furthermore, there is insufficient
evidence at present to indicate whether the Act has been successful or
effective in deterring state-sponsored terror or adequately and consis-
tently compensating its victims and their families without separate
special legislation.  In fact, the plaintiffs who successfully have sued
foreign states and their agents under the Act have struggled to obtain
and collect on the large judgments awarded them by U.S. courts until
very recently.  Nevertheless, the Act does give victims of human
rights abuses resulting from state-sponsored terrorism a forum in
which to assert their claims, to seek reparations, and to be heard.  The
cases brought under the Act to date have attracted significant adverse
international publicity for state sponsors of terror, such as Cuba,
Libya, Iraq, and Iran, which helps to focus world attention on an im-
portant global problem.  It seems likely that such public shaming may
have a positive impact on reducing international terrorism by pres-
suring and deterring state sponsors of terror to change their behavior,
especially in the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001.
Under the status quo there will continue to be tension between
the rights and interests of individual plaintiffs on one hand, and the
foreign policy of the United States vis--vis countries like Afghani-
stan, Iran, Cuba, Iraq, and Libya on the other.  When these interests
collide there is a danger that the constitutional foreign policy-making
power of the President and perhaps the security interests of the
United States could be limited by the individual interests of a small
number of citizens.  Furthermore, under the status quo, U.S. citizens
who are victimized are given access to a remedy that is simply un-
available to citizens of other countries.  This can confer unfair and in-
equitable advantages on certain victims as compared to others.  This
policy runs the risk that the global community will perceive the result
as a caste system based upon wealth and power.  What is needed is an
independent, global compensation system for victims of human rights
221. See Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 52 (D.D.C. 2000) (concluding that
the distinctions drawn by FSIA bear rational relation to the legitimate purpose of eliminating
terrorism).
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violations arising out of state-sponsored terror.  To facilitate this, the
author recommends the expansion of the jurisdiction of the ICC to
explicitly include the crime of terrorism, and to provide a civil and
criminal remedy for victims of state-sponsored terrorism.  This system
would seem far more likely to pass muster under international law
and would avoid the complex question under the Antiterrorism Act
of whether states have implicitly consented to the jurisdiction of the
tribunal.  It would help avoid the problematic sovereignty, equality,
and collateral estoppel issues that plague the Act as well as other
unilateral domestic compensation systems under international law.
Such an international forum would be more legitimate, efficient, and
fair than the unilateral system adopted by the U.S. in the form of the
Antiterrorism Act.
To be an effective remedy for human rights abuses occurring in
the context of state-sponsored terrorism, a system must be designed
with the input of the entire global community, not just that of a single
country acting unilaterally on behalf of its own citizens.  Moreover,
the compensation system created should not be infirm or subject to
legitimate challenge under international law.  It must be widely and
fairly perceived as objective and equitable.  Such a system will more
fully and fairly compensate victims of human rights violations result-
ing from state-sponsored terrorist acts.
Historically, the challenge has been in persuading states to sur-
render a portion of their sovereignty and submit themselves to the
authority of an independent international tribunal with full legal
authority to impose criminal and civil penalties on them for their
sponsorship of terrorist acts.  The states most likely to fund and spon-
sor terrorist acts have tended to be the least likely to voluntarily sub-
mit themselves to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal.  Unless
sufficient international political will develops to create such a body,
the best alternative civil remedy reasonably available to victims of
state-sponsored terrorist acts is the domestic victim compensation sys-
tems in individual states.  In light of the tragic events of September
11, 2001, there may never be greater opportunity or greater political
will than at present for the global community to expand the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC, in order to allow it to adjudicate civil and criminal
claims, compensate victims of state-sponsored terrorist acts and their
families, and punish the perpetrators of state-sponsored terror.  If the
world community fails to take full advantage of this rare and unique
window of opportunity to act, while the consensus against state-
sponsored terror is at unprecedented levels globally, the chance to do
HOYE_FMT.DOC 01/24/02  9:41 AM
152 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 12:105
so may be forever lost. Without taking the initiative, the best the
global community can hope for is a flawed, lopsided, and inequitable
system whose legitimacy, independence, and legality under interna-
tional law is questionable at best.  The victims of the September 11,
2001 attacks and their families, as well as the entire world community
and future victims of state-sponsored terrorism, deserve and are enti-
tled to demand more, especially if the new war on state-sponsored
terrorism is to be a success in the long term.
